particularities of creaturely existence, while Brian Walsh and James K. A. Smith have argued that Pannenberg presents a monistic totality which ultimately eliminates all creaturely differences. According to such criticisms, Pannenberg views temporal finitude only as something which must be overcome by the infinite; in this way, Pannenberg does violence to difference itself, and calls in question the intrinsic goodness of the created order. In the discussion that follows, I will explore these lines of criticism, and I will engage with David Bentley Hart's recent ontological proposal as a particularly sharp and sophisticated form of such critique. With Hart, I accept as a basic ontological axiom the judgment of Emmanuel Levinas that "being" consists in "multiplicity", so that being "refuses totalization but takes form as fraternity and discourse". 6 My aim here is to offer a defence of Pannenberg, and I will do so by attending to Pannenberg's own depiction of the relationship between totality and difference, especially as presented in Metaphysics and the Idea of God. In Pannenberg's view, I will argue, the eschatological totality functions in such a way that difference is preserved as difference within the structure of a coherent semantic whole. To clarify further this conception of totality and difference, I will suggest that Robert W. Jenson's model of the narrative structure of the eschatological consummation provides a highly illuminating analogy of Pannenberg's entire ontological proposal.
II. Future and Totality
In Metaphysics and the Idea of God, Pannenberg follows Plotinus in emphasising "a primacy of the future for the understanding of time". 7 The particularities of temporal existence can be grasped only in their relation to the totality of existence, and, in turn, "the totality of existence [die Ganzheit des Daseins] is possible only from the standpoint of its future", 8 since it is only the future which finally decides the true nature of a thing. Pannenberg illustrates this point with Dilthey's statement that "one would have to wait for the end of history in order to possess complete material for determining the meaning of history". 9 Pannenberg therefore argues that Benjamin Myers 142 6 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, transl. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 216. 7 Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 77 (57). 8 Ibid., 78 (58 future and wholeness "belong together". 10 Only the future can bring completion and wholeness to finite being, and thus the future is primary over both past and present. Indeed, for Pannenberg, the past and present are significant precisely by virtue of their relation to the future -that is, by virtue of their participation in the future totality.
11 It is the future, understood as a total context of meaning, that "interprets the present and the past". 12 If the future is primary in this way, then it also follows that the true essence or identity of a thing is decided only by its future: "its essence [Wesen] , and thus its 'what it is' [Wassein] , are determined by its future". 13 Pannenberg offers this as a new formulation of the notion of "substance": it is the outcome of the temporal process that determines "the whatness [Wassein] of things".
14 Thus things are what they are "retroactively from the outcome of their becoming". 15 This further implies that all being is (as Heidegger also perceived) a being-in-time. "[T]he essence of life as a whole is temporal; it depends upon whatever future it is whose coming will bring about the wholeness of this whole." 16 After all, both our knowledge and the identity of things themselves "are not yet completely present in the process of time". 17 The true nature of a thing, then, is the whole temporal process of its existence, and this process will be completed only in the future. Pannenberg thus goes on to argue that every being should be conceived as the antizipation of its essence, i.e., the anticipation of what it will fully be only in the future. A thing "is what it is always in anticipation of its end and from its end". 18 In sum, therefore, the future is the source of a being's wholeness, and its being is the anticipation of its future.
Crucially, Pannenberg also suggests that the nature of this always-anticipated future is in fact the eternity of God. The future which brings wholeness to human existence is eternity: we have "being" only to extent that we participate anticipatorily in eternity. All created life, therefore, "is to be understood as a form of participation in the divine eternity". 19 The temporal existence of any creature is an anticipation of that creature's final wholeness which is expected from the future of God's eternity. 20 Pannen-
The Difference Totality Makes 143 berg thus offers an important theological correction of Heidegger. While Heidegger had conceived of death as that which brings human existence to its completion, Pannenberg argues that, on the contrary, existence is "much more broken up, fragmented, by death". 21 What is needed, then, is a unifying event that lies beyond death -and this is the eternity of God. "Only a future of our lives' completion […] beyond death can actualise this totality that will manifest the identity of our existence"; and "only participation in the eternity of God can overcome the disintegration of human life into moments that are sundered by the march of time", so that such moments are "integrate[d]" into "unity and totality". 22 It is not death, therefore, but the eternal presence of God which brings completion to the temporal process of a creature's existence and thus determines the true being of that creature. The creature's being here and now is only a participation in this future determination of what it really is.
This emphasis on anticipation does not, however, mean that "being" is somehow postponed until the future consummation. On the contrary, Pannenberg argues that the future affects the entire temporal process retroactively: "The decision concerning the being that stands at the end of the process has retroactive power [rückwirkende Kraft]". 23 Pannenberg elucidates this important point with a botanical example:
A zinnia is already a zinnia as a cutting and remains one during the entire process of its growth up to blossoming, even though the flower bears its name on account of its blossom. If there were only a single such flower, we could not determine its nature in advance; and yet over the period of its growth it would still be what it revealed itself to be at the end. It would possess its essence through anticipation, though only at the end of the developmental process would one be able to know that this was its essence.
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There is thus a "retroactive causality" which the goal or telos of a thing exerts on the whole course of temporal becoming, since "the telos is at the same time the reality of the thing". 25 This emphasis makes it clear that Pannenberg is not merely presenting a process ontology of temporal development and becoming. Indeed, already in his essay on "Theology and the Kingdom of God", Pannenberg had agreed with A. N. Whitehead's view that "the movement of time contributes to deciding what the definite truth is going to be," but he had proceeded to offer an important clarification: "But -and here is the difference from Whitehead -what turns out to be true in the future will then be evident as having been true all along". 26 Benjamin Myers 144 21 Ibid., 86 (62). 22 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology (see above, n. 4), 3 : 601. 23 Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 105 (76) . 24 Ibid., 105 (76) . 25 Ibid., 106 (77) . 26 Pannenberg, "Theology and the Kingdom of God" (see above n. 3), 62-63. For Pannenberg's mature critique of process philosophy, see especially Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 71-73, 113-29 (53-55, 80-91) .
Just as the zinnia really does participate in its essence throughout the whole course of its growth even though its essence is decided only at the end of the process, so too all creatures participate in their being through the retroactive causality of the future. In sum, Pannenberg offers an ontology of the future in which the true nature of things is determined solely by the outcome of history, by the unifying event in which finite existence is gathered up into a single, coherent totality. In the words of Christiaan Mostert, Pannenberg's concern is to develop a concept of "final coherence" in which the whole of reality appears as "a totality of meaning". 27 Creatures within the temporal process of finite becoming participate in their being in so far as they anticipate their final outcome. And this final outcome is, in a word, eternity. It is the event of God's own infinite life, the event of perfect unity and integration.
It would be difficult to overstate the significance of this ambitious proposal, both as a contribution to the tradition of Western metaphysics and as a radical attempt to orient Christian theology around the apocalyptic message of Jesus of Nazareth and the apocalyptically-interpreted event of Jesus' resurrection from the dead.
28 But Pannenberg's proposal has met with serious criticisms, to which we must now turn. In particular, we must ask whether Pannenberg's eschatological ontology leaves room for the continuing significance of creaturely difference, or whether difference is ultimately erased by the triumph of eschatological totality.
III. Totality as Tyranny
The criticism that Pannenberg's conception of totality undermines creaturely difference has been expressed by several writers. In an influential essay, 29 Brian Walsh has presented Pannenberg's ontology as a monism in which there is first a "differentiating oneness" and then a subsequent transcendence of this differentiation. 30 All history is thus the movement of the infinite "in the collapse and overcoming of the finite". 31 Since the future has priority over the present, finitude must be overcome "precisely because it is present" rather than future.
32 Salvation itself, therefore, is nothing other than "release from finitude"; 33 it is the moment in which "the finite loses its finitude". 34 Although Walsh acknowledges that Pannenberg attempts to affirm differentiation, he argues that "in the end the infinite always invalidates the finite". 35 On this reading, Pannenberg's whole system views finitude only as an evil to be transcended and overcome.
In a profound analysis of Pannenberg's doctrine of creation, 36 Niels Henrik Gregersen has also argued that Pannenberg's ontology threatens temporal difference. Gregersen acknowledges that Pannenberg's doctrine of the Trinity places emphasis on God's own "differenzierte Einheit-in-derVielfalt", 37 and he observes that on the basis of this trinitarian conception Pannenberg makes it possible to view the world both in its unity and its differentiation, "sowohl als Einheit als auch als eine bunte Vielfalt".
38 Nevertheless, he criticises Pannenberg's appropriation of Plotinus, noting that the Plotinian concept of eternity "[ist] für das gesamte Spätwerk Pannenbergs maßgebend geworden". 39 Admittedly, the positive aspect of this Plotinian concept is that it overcomes the opposition between eternity and time, since "Ewigkeit wird nicht als Zeitlosigkeit verstanden, sondern als die Fülle von verschiedenen Zeiten (Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft) in dem gleichzeitigen Zusammenklang aller Zeiten in der Ewigkeit". 40 Eternity is thus understood both "als das Zeitübergreifende und als das Zeitumschließende". 41 But Gregersen argues that the religious consequences of this view are nevertheless fatal, since the eternal God is now elevated completely beyond the fragmented differences of our temporal creaturely existence. 42 Pannenberg's ontology thus implies "daß Gott die Menschen eigentlich nicht als Menschen verstehen könnte", in as much as God is removed from the sphere of human existence in its fragmentation, incompleteness and temporal limitation. 43 Gregersen therefore suggests that the Plotinian concept of a totalising eternity can be appropriated only at a high theological price 44 -at the price of God's own personal involvement with the relative and differentiated temporal existence of the created world.
More recently, James K. A. Smith has also subjected Pannenberg's conception of totality to a searching critique. Smith's central claim is that Pannenberg's system "devours difference". 45 Pannenberg conceives of a timeless eternity "beyond finitude and provisionality", a future totality in which all finite differences are erased. 46 In the end, "it is unity that overcomes the evil of diversity and multiplicity found in creation". 47 Pannenberg's whole theology is thus driven towards "suprahumanity" and the "transcendence of finitude". 48 In this conception, Smith argues, "human life as finite is insufficient and must be overcome". 49 But such a devaluing of our temporal finitude necessarily entails both "a devaluing of human being" as such, and "a depreciation of the creational life that has been granted to us by the Creator". 50 Smith therefore pointedly asks: "is [Pannenberg's] future not a rather in-human notion?" 51 According to this reading, then, Pannenberg's ontology of the future is fundamentally a system of violence. Difference, particularity and multiplicity are merely evils to be overcome at last in the timeless eternity of the future. Smith locates the source of all this in Pannenberg's doctrine of creation. For Pannenberg, creation is already "something of a fall, a lapse into temporality and finitude", so that the creature qua created being must be redeemed, completed and submerged in the totality of the future. 52 Whether or not this is an accurate reading of Pannenberg, Smith is surely right to highlight the fundamental importance of creaturely finitude, difference and multiplicity -and to that extent, his critique of Pannenberg should be taken seriously.
Although David Bentley Hart does not engage explicitly with Pannenberg in his magisterial work on The Beauty of the Infinite, 53 we may nevertheless draw Hart into the discussion at this point, since his work presents a uniquely sustained and sophisticated critique of the concept of ontological totality. Opposing the beauty of difference to "the tyranny of the universal", 54 Hart argues that Christian theology must "subvert every presumptuous discourse that would strive to put an end to the deferrals of difference". 55 For Hart, the goodness of God's creation lies precisely in its plurality and difference, in its "intervals and instances of beauty". 56 The significance of creation does not lie in any deeper unity underlying the difference and plurality which appear on the surface of things. Creation is not "a text that conceals a more fundamental set of abstract meanings, to which all its particularities can be reduced". 57 On the contrary, creation's glory is precisely its "surface", precisely the distance between different things in their own uniqueness and particularity. In the gift of creation, God bestows genuine otherness on the creature, so that "distance is given and sustained", a distance "that allows the other to be truly and irreducibly other". 58 Further, Hart argues that the differences of all created beings are grounded in God's own infinite difference and otherness. God is himself "the distance of all things", 59 and the whole created world in all its irreducible diversity thus expresses "the dynamism and differentiation that God is".
60 While Pannenberg looks favourably on the ontology of Plotinus, 61 Hart critiques Plotinus' conception of the Nous as the unifying similarity of all things. In contrast to such a totalising ontology, Hart insists that God's Logos contains "the whole rhetoric, the entire display, of infinitely many differences". 62 God therefore not only affirms distance and difference; he is himself the difference between creator and creature and between all individual creatures. God is "the distance, the interval, between God and creation", and his own infinite otherness comprehends all creaturely differences.
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From within this framework, Hart thus conceives of reconciliation not as the sublation of difference but as the liberation of each particular thing to the "surface" of being, so that each thing is set free to be itself in its own proper otherness. In bringing salvation to the world, God thus overcomes every totality and affirms the goodness of difference: "Because being's differences are affirmed in their particularity, because God elects just these differences, and delights in them, he does not merely consign difference to fate […], but also acts to liberate what he made from sin and death: this is his infinite 'it is good.'" 64 The eschatological consummation, too, will consist precisely in the perfected harmony of difference. The music of creation, Hart says, will be restored "not as a totality", but as a pure harmony in which all tonal discords are finally reconciled. 65 This eschatological harmony is achieved through "innumerable […] reconciliations" as each particular thing is liberated to be itself in perfect difference from all other things. 66 Hart therefore speaks of the eschatological kingdom as "the beautiful 'surfacing' of being, the endless liberation of difference into the light". 67 The infinity of God overcomes every totality, every violence against difference, so that, in the end, the work of reconciliation is not a sublation but a symphony. 68 While Hart does not critique Pannenberg explicitly, his vision of the goodness of otherness and of the triumph of infinite difference over ontological totality provides a sharp lens through which to view Pannenberg's own depiction of reality as eschatological totality. Does Pannenberg in fact construct what Timothy Bradshaw calls "a new idealist type of monism"? 69 Is his project merely another instance of metaphysical violence, in which difference is finally eliminated in the pursuit of an undifferentiated whole? Does he fail to take seriously enough the "surface" of things, the goodness of sheer otherness and particularity? Does his conception of the eternity of God finally do away with the difference -and thus the goodness -of creaturely being?
Such questions pose a serious challenge to Pannenberg's project. In the next sections, I will try to respond to this challenge by suggesting that Pannenberg does in fact give due emphasis to finite difference and particularity, and that the fundamental aim of his ontology is to correlate both totality and difference within a vision of the world's eschatological future.
IV. Totality and Difference
While critics like Gregersen, Walsh and Smith have rightly highlighted Pannenberg's emphasis on reality as a unified totality, it should be noted that Pannenberg consistently attempts to articulate the differentiated nature of this totality. The category of the whole, he argues, is concerned precisely with "what is individual". 70 As Mostert notes, Pannenberg's "fundamental ontological vision" is thus not of a totality that eliminates difference, but of "a differentiated totality". 71 The Difference Totality Makes 149
In his analysis of the concept of the whole, Pannenberg writes:
[E]very individual appearance occurs within a context which itself is unique, and which itself forms (in a certain sense) a whole in which the individual appearance has a specific, unexchangeable place. For precisely this reason, each appearance is part of such a whole. 72 The whole, then, is not the antithesis of the particular. Rather, it is the context of the whole that endows each individual thing with its own "unexchangeable" particularity. On the other hand, the whole is itself realised only in and through such particularities. Pannenberg critiques Heidegger on exactly this score: Heidegger, he observes, fails to develop a properly differentiated account of the whole. In contrast, Pannenberg argues that "[t]he whole has definiteness only in the particular". 73 The whole is not the elimination or Hegelian sublation (Aufhebung) 74 of difference, then, but rather that which takes place in difference itself. Pannenberg therefore thinks that Dilthey is closer than Heidegger to the truth, since Dilthey recognises that "[w]e 'have' the whole of life, its total meaning, only in the individual and the specific, in which the whole manifests itself". 75 The particular is thus the locus of the whole; difference is the locus of totality. This means that, for Pannenberg, there can be no question of the ultimate elimination of difference in totality, since the elimination of the particular would, eo ipso, be the elimination of the whole. Pannenberg's concern, rather, is to articulate the unity between the particular and the whole. This unity, he says, is God -or, to be more precise, God is "the unifying unity" in which both part and whole and properly related. 76 God is himself a "differentiated structure"; he is not the anthesis of difference or an ontological monad, for he always already contains difference within himself, a difference which typifies analogically the relatedness of part and whole. 77 Hence just as Hart grounds creaturely difference in the infinite difference of God's life, so too, for Pannenberg, all differentiation is grounded in the unity-in-distinction of the trinitarian persons. For this reason, Pannenberg can affirm all creatures' eschatological participation in God without thereby undermining the particularity of each individual creature and the
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proper distinction between each thing and God. Participation in God, he writes, is not a "violation of the distinction between God and creature"; 78 rather, the finitude of creatures and "their distinction from God and one another" will also continue in the eschatological consummation. 79 Thus each individual creature is "preserved in its eschatological consummation before God"; it is "not swallowed up by the presence of God", 80 but, on the contrary, the eschatological totality of reality is manifest precisely in the particularity of each individual. The final appearance of the totality is therefore also the definitive appearance of the differentiations of all finite being. Differences are not dissolved in totality, but are integrated so that they find their proper place both as differences and as instances of the totality of reality. In Pannenberg's words:
Not only the individualities of creaturely reality but even the differences of moments of time […] are not erased, but are no longer seen apart. God is the future of the finite from which it again receives its existence as a whole. 81 One might describe this not as the erasure of temporal finitude, but as the actualisation of the finite, as the bringing of finitude to its full potential, so that all created reality at last receives from God "its true and definitive identity". 82 
V. Narrative Totality: Pannenberg and Robert W. Jenson
The claim that Pannenberg's ontology "devours difference" 83 must therefore be regarded as a strong misreading. I believe Pannenberg's understanding of totality and difference can be clarified further if we draw an analogy between his eschatological ontology and Robert W. Jenson's model of the narrative structure of the relationship between difference and totality. For Jenson, the ordering of a narrative is established by "the outcome of the narrated events"; the end of the narrative endows each particular moment of the preceding sequence with its own proper reality and contingency. 84 In this way, a narrative "closure" brings wholeness and integrity to the entire sequence of events; the temporal process is a single, coherent creation since "its closure makes it a whole". 85 From the perspec-
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tive of this narrative model, Jenson thus regards the future as "ontologically prior to the present". 86 There is, in turn, a certain fittingness to the whole narrative of reality, a "dramatic appropriateness" that gives coherence and continuity to the whole. 87 But this narrative fittingness is grounded not in the temporal sequence itself but rather in the end of the sequence: only from the future can the proper shape or fittingness of the whole be discerned. 88 In depicting all reality as a temporal process which receives its unity retroactively from its final "closure", Jenson thus emphasises the narrative character of this unity: reality is unified eschatologically in the way that a play is unified by its final act or a novel by its denouement. Such integrating closure is, in other words, a temporal conclusion which stands in a relationship of narrative fittingness to the entire preceding temporal process.
If Jenson's dramatic-narrative model is employed as an analogy of Pannenberg's ontology, it becomes clear that the eschatological totality should be regarded not as a moment of static unification, but rather as a semantic context 89 which establishes the particularity of each part of the temporal process and endows each part with its own distinct meaning. Pannenberg himself has described such a semantic context as a horizon of meaning "within which it becomes possible to determine the particular by distinguishing it from others". 90 One might say, then, that the continuity of the whole sequence of temporal events is established from the end of reality's narrative, and in this way each unique particularity receives its proper distinctiveness retroactively within the context of the total narrative. 91 As Jenson puts it, each particular temporal event is therefore contingent -it has "the capacity to surprise" -even though, after the event, the whole temporal sequence "displays a coherent dramatic sense that has been tightened by that very event". 92 Further, while Pannenberg's ontology has at times been characterised as a determinism from the future 93 or even as a kind of Calvinism in re-verse, 94 Jenson's model of dramatic cohesion clarifies the non-deterministic relationship between creation and eschaton, nature and grace. There is a narrative fittingness between created reality itself and the eschatological consummation, but this is a contingent fittingness established only at the end of the temporal sequence. The conclusion to created reality is not simply latent within the creation itself, nor is this consummation (from the creature's perspective) the only possible or necessary conclusion to the temporal process. Rather, the eschatological consummation is strictly nonnecessary -or better, to borrow Eberhard Jüngel's term, it is "more than necessary" (mehr als notwendig). 95 It is the contingent arrival of a genuine novum from the future, a novum which contextualises the entire preceding sequence of temporal events.
Thus the unifying event of narrative "closure" establishes a specific contingent coordination between the pluralities of finite existence. Such pluralities are integrated not by an overcoming or sublation of their differences, but precisely by their proper relatedness to one another within a coherent semantic context. In Jenson's terms, therefore, one could describe Pannenberg's totality as a narrative totality. Just as the whole narrative sequence in certain novels is contextualised and integrated by the denouement, so too the differences of finite reality are integrated within the meaning-giving context of the eschatological totality. Strikingly, Hart himself uses a similar narrative model to articulate his ontology of difference: God brings salvation, he says, "by electing one story as the truth of the world", 96 and this means that "[t]o redeem each thing is to integrate it into the story of God's peace". 97 Such a model of narrative totality is very close to what Pannenberg had in view even in his early essay on "Theology and the Kingdom of God", where he argued that "unity acquires identity by exhibiting some meaningful connection in the sequence of events". 98 Here, the relation between totality and difference is clearly articulated: the eschatological conclusion does not unify reality in spite of difference -it unifies reality precisely in the event of the contextualising of difference. And from this perspective, difference is not undermined but rather established in the moment of integration, since only at this point is the relationship (and thus the dif-ferentiation) between all individual parts of reality fully established. In theological terms: God is himself the ground of creaturely plurality, and God secures this plurality once and for all in the eschatological consummation of reality.
In the same early essay, Pannenberg expressed this crucial point by invoking the theological theme of the love of God. Because God the creator is love, "he separates another being from himself while still keeping it alive by maintaining its relation to himself". 99 The ground of the creature's difference and finitude, therefore, is God himself. Thus Niels Henrik Gregersen's critique of Pannenberg 100 fails at precisely this point, since, for Pannenberg, God is not an abstract Plotinian principle of totality, but he is the God who establishes his creatures in love. God's power -die Macht der Zukunft! -is the power of love which grants authentic differentiated existence to all God's creatures.
VI. Conclusion
While some critics have regarded Pannenberg's eschatological totality as an ontological tyranny, it is clear that Pannenberg is in fact concerned not only with totality but also with creaturely differentiation. While Pannenberg's critics have at times assumed an irreconcilable contradiction between totality and difference, for Pannenberg himself there is no such contradiction. Totality is not the negation of difference, but it is precisely the actualisation of difference within a coherent semantic whole. Each finite particularity receives its meaning from its place within the whole semantic context. In this way, the totality functions as the ground and preservation of creaturely differentiation: the finite particularities of temporal existence receive their place and their identity from the eschatological totality of God's eternal kingdom.
This relationship between difference and totality is brought out clearly in Pannenberg's mature discussion of the final resurrection. The resurrection, he says, involves a removal of "individual autonomy and separation", but not an "erasure of individual particularity". 101 Resurrected individuals are thus integrated and brought into harmony, so that they can now "liv[e] out their finitude in its relation to the individuality of others".
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The result, then, is not the elimination of finitude or of creaturely differentiation, but a gathering up of all creatures into a harmonious interrelatedness which properly defines each creature and gives it its meaning.
Here in the closing section of Pannenberg's Systematic Theology, the recurring motif of his ontology is evident: in the eschatological totality, each individual thing is established in its own place as a unique locus of the manifestation of the totality. Pannenberg's model, therefore, is not one of totality at the expense of difference, but rather one of totality for the sake of difference and of difference for the sake of totality. And it is certainly no accident that Pannenberg's own metaphor for this relationship between difference and totality is precisely the same as David Bentley Hart's central metaphor: that of music. At the eschatological consummation, the irreducibly differentiated life of creation is brought together in a "many-voiced harmony of the praise of God". 
